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JOANNE LINNEROOTH*

The Danube River Basin:
Negotiating Settlements to
Transboundary Environmental
Issues* *
ABSTRACT
The deterioratingwater quality of the Danube River and the ecological
problems created by its continuing exploitationfor electricity generation
are major issuesfacing countries in the DanubeRiver Basin. In response,
representativesfrom the eight Danube ripariancountries have recently
declared their willingness to cooperate on the management of this important European river. In the absence of a comprehensive, basin-wide
planning authority, this Danube Declarationis an importantfirst step in
establishing cooperative policies. Still, many hurdles remain before intentions become practice. This article describes the scientific and institutional complexities involved in negotiating agreements among the Danube
ripariannations and suggests forms of cooperative action. A potential
role for an independent analyst in the negotiationprocess is discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The Danube -is one of the most international river basins in the world.
Recently, representatives from eight European countries bordering the
Danube declared their willingness to cooperate on its management, especially in confronting the mounting problems of water pollution. This
non-binding Danube Declaration' is an important step towards a more
cooperative ecosystem approach to the management of the river. Accordingly, greater attention should be paid to making informed tradeoffs
on the river's conflicting uses and particularly to the interrelationships
*International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, A-2361 Laxenburg. Austria.
**This article was supported by a grant from the Carnegie Foundation to the International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis project on the Processes of International Negotiations. The author is
grateful for the helpful comments and assistance received from W.C. Clark. Acad. Z. Kaczmarek,
G. Kovacs, D.P. Loucks, L. Mermet and E. Weber. The author takes full responsibility for all views
expressed in this article.
I. Declaration of the Danube Countries to Cooperate on Questions Concerning the Water Management of the Danube. especially to protect the Danube from Pollution, reprinted in Aktuelle
Ostereichische Praxis zum VOlkerrecht 1985-1986, Osterreichische Zeitschrift flir6fftentliches Recht
und Vilkerrecht 429 (P. Fischer & G. Hafner eds. 1986) [hereinafter Danube Declaration].
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between the biological and physical properties of the river and other
environmental media.'
The Danube is one of the more than 200 river basins shared by two
or more countries which comprise almost 50 percent of the earth's land.'
The Danube Declaration is one of more than 300 international treaties
concerning water resources. For the most part, these treaties relate to
issues of navigation, apportionment, and flood control; few have addressed the more qualitative issues of water quality and the ecosystem
of the river basin. 4 The challenge presented .by the Danube Declaration
can be appreciated by considering that its implementation requires cooperation:
"
"
"
"

among eight countries spanning Eastern and Western Europe;
in the absence of effective and enforceable international legal rules;
in the absence of a basin-wide planning or decision authority;
between numerous national and international authorities with diverse, conflicting interests;
* on problems for which the geopolitics of the "upstream" and
"downstream" countries creates disincentives for cooperative behavior;
" on issues characterized by serious scientific gaps and uncertainties;
and
* in an atmosphere of increasing concern about the long-term effects
of toxic pollutants and an acute awareness that pollutants cross
national boundaries.
The urgency of improving cooperation on the management of the Danube was recently dramatized by the disastrous release of toxic chemicals
into the Rhine- River, an accident for which no river in the world can
claim immunity. Apart from accidental releases, the most uigent issues
on the Danube River today are the deteriorating quality of the water and
the competing demands created by the exploitation of the river for the
generation of electric power. Progress on these issues is hampered more
by the political and institutional difficulties in reaching and implementing
agreements among the riparian nations than by scientific and technical
obstacles. In this article, the political and institutional hurdles involved
in negotiating and reaching agreements for improving the quality of Danube water are described, and possible forms that cooperation might take
2.White, World Trends and Needs, in Water in a Developing World I (A. Utton & L. Teclaff
eds. 1978).
3. Biswas. Some Major Issues in River Basin Management for Developing Countries. in River
Basin Development 327 (A. Biswas. A. Khan & A. Nishat eds. 1983).
4. E. Vlachos, The Challenges of Transboundary River Basins. The Management of International
River Basin Conflicts (Sept. 22-25. 1986) (paper presented at the Workshop on Management of
International River Conflicts, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria).
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are suggested. A potential role for the analyst in aiding the bilateral and

multilateral negotiation process is discussed.
THE DANUBE RIVER
Flowing over 2,850 kilometers from the Black Forest in the Federal
Republic of Germany to the Black Sea in Rumania and the Soviet Union,
the Danube is Europe's second largest river (Figure 1). It is also one of
the world's most international rivers with eight riparian countries, including West Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia,
Rumania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union, and it transfers water from
the non-riparian countries of Albania, Italy, Switzerland, and Poland.
Over 70 million people live in the Danube River Basin.'
Near its source, the Danube has the character of a mountain river
flowing through West Germany and Austria (passing Regensburg and
Vienna) into Czechoslovakia, where at Bratislava it forms the border
between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Flowing south through the Great
Hungarian Plain (passing Budapest), it turns eastward into Yugoslavia
(passing Belgrade) and later forms the border between Yugoslavia and
Rumania with the famous narrows at the Iron Gate. The lower, marshy
section of the river serves again as a geographic boundary on the long
stretch between Rumania and Bulgaria, where shortly before the Black
Sea it separates Rumania and the Soviet Union, and empties into a spectacular delta. Over 300 tributaries flow into the Danube.
The geographic variety of the Danube is matched by the cultural,
economic, and political diversity of the countries through which it flows.
Connecting Eastern and Western Europe, its joint management symbolizes
the potential for cooperation between diverse social, political, and economic cultures. Issues related to Danube development and environmental
protection invoke, however, a different set of national and local actors,
different administrative laws and procedures, different national priorities,
and widely-differing resources for their solution. Countries at the upper
reaches of the river (West Germany and Austria) stand in sharp contrast
to those at the lower reaches (Yugoslavia and Rumania) both with respect
to industrial development and a consciousness of environmental problems.
Table 1 shows the different economic and Danube-related alignments of
the eight riparian countries. In addition, two U.N. organizations, the
Economic Commission of Europe and the World Health Organization,
have been active in matters related to the Danube.
The Danube is a natural link between East and West, and its history
5. Benedek & Laszlo, A Large International River: The Danube, 13 Progress in Water Technology
61. 61-76 (1980).
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Table 1. Economic and Danube-Related Alignments of the

Eight Riparian Countries.
EC
West Germany
Austria
Yugoslavia
Czechoslovakia
Bulgaria
Rumania
Hungary
Soviet Union
EC
EFTA
OECD
CMEA
BT
DC

Danube-Related

Economic

Cowurv

EFTA

OECD

X

X
X
Obs

X

CMEA

BT

DC

Obs
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Obs
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

= European Communities

=
=
=
=
=

European Free Trade Association
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
Bratislava Treaty of 1955
Danube Commission

reflects the ever shifting balance of power in the Danube basin. In the
words of Stephen Gorove:
In Roman times it was considered as the northern border of the
civilized world beyond which the light of the Eternal City vanished
into barbarian darkness. Since then it has frequently formed a boundary between many of the riparian states. It has divided men, nations
and civilizations from the long and fateful crusades of Christendom
against the Turks, down to the gigantic struggles of Slavs and Germans. It has given additional impetus to the descent of the Iron
Curtain, separating East and West .... ,

Before World War 11, the administration of the Danube was controlled
by the single European Commission of the Danube 7 which established
free navigation of the Danube for all European countries. Currently the
river is governed by the Belgrade Convention of 1948, which clearly
established Soviet dominance of the Danube by substituting the concept
of free navigation with navigation under the exclusive control of the
riparian countries, most of which were Soviet satellites.' The convention
also changed the structure of the long-standing Danube Commission which
was given quasi-legislative powers, but powers governing only river navigation and river inspection. 9
Diverse, Conflicting Uses of a Large River
Possibly no other natural resource has so many uses as a river. Or6. S. Gorove, Law and Politics of the Danube 2 (1964).
7. The Treaty of Versailles. June 28, 1919, 225 Party's T.S. 188.
8. S. Gorove, supra note 6, at 152.
9. Id. at 134.

Susmmer 19901

THE DANUBE RIVER BASIN

ganizations responsible for river management must find a balance for the
following fundamental, but sometimes conflicting, interests:
• Maintaining the river flow (for electric power generation and for
the disposal of industrial and urban wastes);
" Maintaining and expanding the navigable waterways (for navigation);
• Assuring an adequate supply of water (for irrigation, industrial
cooling processes, and all other uses);
" Protecting the water quality (for potable water, irrigation, fishing,
recreation, tourism, and nature preservation);
" Preventing floods (for all uses); and
" Preserving the river and its surroundings (for recreation, tourism,
and nature preservation).
Any management strategy will involve tradeoffs. Electric power generation, navigation, and waste disposal, for example, conflict with such
uses as irrigation, fisheries, tourism, and supplies of potable water, all
of which require good water quality. Irrigation requires enormous quantities of water and may seriously reduce the supply of water for other
purposes.
Historically, international river disputes have involved mainly conflicts
over water apportionment, for example diverting the water for industrial
and agricultural uses by the upstream countries and depriving those downstream of adequate supplies.'" The financing and control of flood prevention projects, with both advantages and disadvantages for downstream
riparians, has been another contentious area, but also an issue that has
presented opportunities for the cooperative management of rivers. Cooperation has been established in many river basins to promote large and
multipurpose development projects, increase the supply of water, prevent
wide-scale flooding, produce electric energy, and improve navigation."
Regrettably, this cooperation on river development projects has generally
not evolved into mutual programs for combatting water pollution and
assuring the environmental quality of the river basin. The potential conflict
between the large-scale development of a river and its surroundings (with
accompanying pollution problems), and the protection of the water quality
and the environment is increasingly the basis of international disputes. '
Issues of water apportionment and flood control have not shaken the
10. See. Teclaff, Harmonizing Water Use and Development with Environmental Protection, in
Water in a Developing World 72, 72 (A. Utton & L. Teclaff eds. 1978).
II. See, Alheritier, International Cooperation and Inland Waters: The Influence of Federalism,
supra note 10. at 166.
12. Because of the huge areas affected and the sheer scale of some proposed developments, longdistance (interbasin) transfers of water have evoked particular concern over the nature and scope of
environmental changes. For instance, intense scientific and public debates have arisen over such
proposals as shunting water from the Alaskan rivers through Canada and into the. western United
States, or the (abandoned) Soviet project for turning the Siberian rivers southward into Central Asia.
For a discussion, see Teclaff, supra note 10, at 77-78.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol. 30

Danube countries to the extent these issues have characterized the political
development of many other river basins. The water supply of the Danube
is not significantly exploited for agricultural purposes. A great deal of
water is used for industrial purposes, 3 but much of this water is released
back into the water supply and, therefore, only the quality of the water
is affected. Flood control has primarily occupied national governments,
with a few important exceptions, such as the Tisza River (Hungary and
the USSR) and the Prut River (Rumania and USSR)."
Major Danube Issues and Conflicts
The principle Danube issues that have provided a foundation for negotiated treaty making and institution building have concerned navigation
and electric power generation. The geography of the Danube has presented
arduous obstacles to navigation, including large shallow stretches, hazardous rapids, severe ice in the winter, and heavy floods after the spring
thaws. The long-standing Danube Commission has been instrumental in
remedying most of these obstacles and has served as a forum for negotiating disputes mainly concerning the financing of the necessary investments.
Despite substantial investments for assuring its navigability, the Danube
is still not a major waterway in comparison with other European rivers."
The international importance of the Danube, however, may radically
change with the completion of the Rhine-Maine-Danube canal which, by
connecting the Atlantic Ocean with the Black Sea, will allow ships to
cross Eastern and Western Europe. This canal is the final link of a longstanding plan to create an interconnected system of inland waterways in
Europe. 6 Its critics have protested the possible negative effects on Danube
13. In the. U.S., for example, industry accounts for over 40 percent of overall water consumption.
See A. Biswas. A. Khan & A. Nishat. River Basin Development (Dec. 1981) (paper presented at
the National Symposium on River Basin Development, Dublin).
14. Flood control is a potential area of international dispute on the Danube since the past and
current trend in building levies as opposed to flood plains increases the intensity of the flooding in
downstream countries. See E. Wood, Application of Conflict Resolution Techniques to the Problems
of International River Basin Management. IIASA Doc.# WP-75-48 (1975) (available at International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Laxenburg, Austria).
15. Around 60 million tons of materials are transported annually on the Danube and its tributaries.
compared, for example, with around 700 million tons transported on West European waterways.
The Yugoslavs transport the most goods on the Danube and its tributaries (22 million tons/year)
followed by the Soviets (15 million tons/year), and the rest of the countries (26 million tons/year).
See J. Linnerooth. The Transportation of Dangerous Substances (1985) (unpublished Report. available
at International Institute for Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria).
16. Its full cost (around I billion dollars) will be financed fully by the federal government of
West Germany and the state government of Bavaria. This cost, it is estimated, will be recovered by
the planned hydroelectric stations on the canal and the use of water for itrigation, industrial, and
recreational purposes, and including the increased opportunities for German shipping. The Economic
Commission of Europe has estimated that by the end of the 1980s, the traffic on the canal between
Nuremberg and Regensburg will be approximately 14 million tons per year. See Rhein-Main-Donau,
Inc.. Construction Report 1974, Munich (April 1975).
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water quality resulting from the increased chan-des of accidental spills of
hazardous substances due to the expanding traffic on the river. 7
The mountainous character of the Danube in its upper reaches and the
large number of tributaries further downstream combine to make the
energy potential of the river significant. This potential has largely, though
not fully, been exploited. There are 49 planned or existing hydropower
stations on the Danube, 40 of which are located in West Germany and
Austria. These 40 power stations are matched in energy output by the
two enormous Iron Gate stations between Yugoslavia and Rumania. ' The
huge Iron Gate project is one of several examples of collaboration between
two riparian countries in developing the joint water resource.
The further development of the river for hydropower production has
become highly controversial. After intense public opposition, a plan to
construct a hydropower station in a nature reserve in Austria was abandoned. Another project was planned to improve the navigable channel
along the shallow stretch between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and for
the construction of two hydropower stations at Gabcikovo and Nagymaros. A third country, Austria, would have contributed substantially to
finance the Nagymaros project in return for imported electricity once the
project was completed."' The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project, has come
under heavy attack from environmental groups, especially in Austria and
Hungary. Among their worst fears are damaging the ecology of the river,
destroying the wetlands of northwest Hungary, and adversely affecting
the groundwater. Because of the intensity of political opposition in Hungary, the project has been suspended until further study. As a result of
this project, and a similarly abandoned plant to construct a hydropower
station in a nature reserve in Austria, the development of the Danube has
become a visible and controversial public issue in the upper and middle
riparian countries.
As early as 1977, the World Health Organization warned that pollution
controls on the Danube were not adequate. ' The pollution problems are
worsening mainly as a result of the rapid economic development of the
Danube basin and the accompanying increase in point and non-point
pollution sources." As countermeasures, at least for the organic pollution,
some urban centers, especially in the upper reaches of the Danube, have
17. See Benedek. Literathy & Somlyody. Monitoring and Modeling Efforts on the Large International River (Danube). 10 Progress in Water Technology 147, 153 (1978).
18. Benedek & Laszlo. supra note 5 at 65.
19. Austria would have financed about 70% of the estimated investment of around $300 million.
Das Donaukrafwerk Nagymaros. 109 Schiffahrt und Strom 13, 13 (Aug./Sept, 1986).
20. World Health Organization. Pilot Zones for Water Quality Management, HUN/PIP 00/S014.
Copenhagen (1977).
21. See World Health Organization, Study and Assessment of the Water Quality of the River
Danube, ICPIRCF 204 0301 1. Geneva (1982).
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or are constructing sewage treatment plants." Without further measures,
the planned construction of barrages and hydropower stations may also
have an effect on water quality.23
The expected rapid economic development in the Danube Basin, the
planned opening of the Rhine-Maine-Danube canal, and the possible
construction of more barrages and hydropower stations will undoubtedly
contribute to a change in Danube water quality, possibly along with other
ecological consequences. The costs of this river water degradation as well
as the benefits from the development of the Danube are not evenly distributed among the riparian countries. The more prosperous upper riparian
countries depend on the Danube mostly for industrial and waste disposal
purposes and benefit greatly from the water power potential. The lessdeveloped lower riparian countries are more dependent on the river for
drinking water, irrigation, fisheries, and a large tourist industry at the
Black Sea. As a middle riparian, Hungary has little exploitable energy
from the Danube, is required to make large investments in adapting its
wetlands to a navigable channel, and is becoming increasingly concerned
with pollution that originates primarily upstream and threatens the large
quantities of water used for drinking and irrigation.' Some 97 percent
of Hungary's surface water originates out of the country. 2 These upstream-downstream disparities will be discussed further in Section IV.
The asymmetrical interests regarding the need for less-polluted Danube
water, which are found mainly in those countries at the lower reaches of
the river, are confounded by the asymmetry of the resources available
for pollution control, which are found mainly in those countries at the
upper reaches. The Danube can therefore be characterized, by an extreme
mismatch between countries which would benefit from pollution control
and those with the resources .for providing this control. This mismatch
is tempered, however, by the greater sense of environmental protection
on the part of the upper riparian countries. While West Germany and
Austria have the least direct benefits from improved Danube water quality,
the emerging environmental movements in these countries, as well as
Hungary's recent environmental movement, may give the issue a sense
of political urgency.
22. See B. Hock and G. Kovacs. A Large International River: The Danube, HIASA Doc.# WP87-i (1978) (available at International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria).
23. The issue whether barrages and hydropower stations contribute to worsening water pollution
is controversial and not fully resolved within the scientific community. Barrages and dams block
the flow of suspended particles which may then accumulate on some stretches of the river bed.
providing a possible long-term reservoir of pollutants and influencing the water exchange between
the groundwater and the river. Moreover, they reduce the velocity of the river flow and, in this way,
lessen its capacity for regeneration from organic pollution. This loss in oxygen may be compensated,
however, by the increase of the water surface and by the aeration of the water at the barrages.
24. Benedek & Laszlo. supra note 5 at 63.
25. Benedek & Hock. Water Pollution Control on the River Danube, in River Pollution Control
77, 78, 77-93 (M. Stift ed. 1980).
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THE DANUBE WATER QUALITY ISSUE

Despite efforts on the part of the United Nations and the European
Economic Community, there are as yet no fully standardized definitions
and measures for the concept of waterquality. This absence of any generally accepted notion of what constitutes water pollution contributes to
the heterogeneity of the Danube water pollution issue. The water quality
data collected by the eight Danube countries is not comparable since
different measures are taken using widely divergent sampling techniques.16
Water quality definitions and measurements are not static, but develop
dynamically to reflect their evolving purposes. They also reflect the perceptions, or contexts, of the problems as viewed by the different people
or organizations concerned. While perceptions of the urgency of (and the
resources for) environmental protection vary widely across Danube riparians, there may be a certain "common culture" shared by persons
occupying the same professional or public roles. Three different perceptions of the Danube water quality issue can be roughly identified; those
of the national (governmental) administrators, the international scientific
community, and the emerging environmental interest groups.
The Governmental, Administrative Perspective
Following the Danube Declaration, the national governments are stepping up efforts to harmonize water quality definitions with neighboring
riparian countries. These efforts are frustrated, however, by the diverse
working definitions of the problem on the part of the relevant authorities

in each of the riparian countries. These" differences reflect, in part, the
multiple uses of the water. The upper-Danube riparian countries are the
most industrialized and depend to a lesser extent on the river for agriculture and potable water than those riparian countries located at the

middle and lower reaches, where there are also large fisheries and a highly-

developed tourist industry at the Black Sea. 2' Understandably, indicators

of water quality and water sampling techniques have been developed in
each country to reflecr the dominant uses of the water in that country. In
addition, indicators depend to a surprising extent on pragmatic, admin26. The problem of obtaining a representative sample for a pollutant is not trivial. Since the
mixing potential of a riveris highly complex, the concentration of a pollutant may depend critically
on where and when the sample is taken, e.g., on the left or right bank, in the middle, at the surface,
etc.. and whether sampled hourly, weekly. monthly etc. The length of a pollution plume from its

source also depends upon the flow conditions of the river. Thus, the mean concentration of apollutant
at a cross-section of the river may not be representative of the pollution generally.
27. The downstream Danube riparians (Yugoslavia. Rumania, Bulgaria. and the USSR) have the
major fisheries with an annual catch which is at least three times as great as the upper riparians
(West Germany. Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary). See R. Liepolt, Limnologie der Donau 38
(1967).
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istrative considerations, for example laboratory facilities and practices,
personnel, and equipment.
Despite differences in definition and measurement practices, the responsible national authorities share an overall common perspective of the
problem, which is shaped by their mutual interest in limiting the concept
to proportions with which they have generally dealt and for which they
can currently cope. Water quality has traditionally been defined by such
indicators as dissolved oxygen, pH, bacteria counts, temperature, and
hardness. More recently the concept has been broadened somewhat to
include selected prevalent chemicals and persistent, toxic substances.'
Still, the most quoted summary notion of water quality in many countries
remains the dissolved oxygen content.' With regards to this measure,
the water quality of the Danube is relatively good, and the river can be
classified generally as Class 11. This is surprising considering that many
of the major cities and regions, especially on the lower reaches of the
river, have no or only partial waste treatment facilities3 (which often
operate at far less than full efficiency). Paper and wood pulp industries
in the upper riparian countries are also a significant source of organic
pollution.*2" Apparently, the Danube has a good capacity for self purification with respect to biodegradable pollutants.
National and local water authorities are becoming concerned, however,
that dissolved oxygen, although it remains the most quoted index for
water quality with respect to effluent disposal, may not be a vitally important characteristic for establishing whether river water is fit for consumption.3" This measure does not account for non-biodegradable and
persistent toxic pollutants, including heavy metals and compounds of
higher molecular weight, for example polyaromatic hydrocarbons. Toxic
pollution threatens the use of the river as a potable water source. This is
of substantial potential concern to the riparian countries since the river
28. For example, the concentrations of ammonia, calcium, magnesium. sulfates, chloride. phosphates, oil, phenols, detergents, heavy metals and certain hydrocarbons. Benedek & Laszlo, supra
note 5. at 69.
29. In some countries, the DOD index is used more frequently to describe the quality of rivers
or reservoirs. Peronal communication with G. Kovacs, former leader of the Large International
Rivers Project at IIASA, in Laxenburg. Austria (Aug. 1986).
30. European rivers are often classified on a scale from Ito IV. Class I denotes excellent quality
with high oxygen content sufficient to support trout; Class 11has sufficient oxygen to support fish;
Class I denotes water with little oxygen as a result of biological pollution; Class IV denotes extreme
organic pollution. Drossler, A)tion "Saubere Flisse'"1985-1993, Bundesministerium fOr Bauten und
Technik. Wien at 4 (Jan. 1985).
31. With the exception of Regensburg (West Germany), Linz (Austria), and Vienna (Austria),
the other major cities and regions, Bratislava (Czechoslovakia), Gyor region (Hungary). Novi Sad
(Yugoslavia), Belgrade (Yugoslavia) and Budapest (Hungary) have no, or only partial, facilities for
treating wastes. B. Hock & G. Kovacs. supra note 22. at 77.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Beck, Modeling for Management, in River Pollution Control. supra note 25, at 214.
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is used as a major source of drinking water in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and
Rumania, and supplies an important part of the drinking water in Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria.
The Scientific Community Perspective
The trend in the scientific community is to broaden the water pollution
concept, both with regards to the causes of the pollution and with respect
to its definition. Kovacs, for instance, describes river pollution as an
integrated, environmental problem resulting not only from unregulated
industrial pollutants and accidental releases, but also from such factors
as airborne and other non-point source pollutants, urbanization, deforestation, erosion, and intensified agriculture.' Water pollution is, therefore,
a problem of cross-media pollution.35 This notion of water pollution
significantly expands the regulatory task from the more conventional focus
on point sources to a more general concern with the side effects of
economic and social development. Moreover, the scientific community
is becoming acutely aware of the interrelationships between surface and
groundwater.
Considerable research effort is also being directed toward understanding
the problems involved with toxic substances. Especially in North America, concern over toxic, bioresistant pollutants is dominating more conventional water pollution issues. 6 This same concern has motivated the
European Community to issue a directive setting out two lists of dangerous
substances. The "black list" includes pesticides, mercury, cadmium, carcinogens, and other substances chosen according to their toxicity, their
persistence in the environment, and their properties of bio-accumulation
in flora, fauna, and the food chain, and therefore also in humans. The
"grey list" includes substances whose harmful effects on the environment
can be confined to a given area and depend on the characteristics and
location of the water into which the substances are discharged."
The health and ecological effects of toxic pollutants are far from settled
in any scientific sense. The problems and uncertainties involved in controlling toxic substances can be appreciated by considering the following:
0 there are about 7 million known chemicals;
34. Kovacs, Decision Support Systems for Managing Large International Rivers, in The Man.
agement of International River Basin Conflicts, 132. 133 (E. Vlachos, A. Webb & 1. Murphy eds.

1986).
35. See Teclaff & Teclaff, International Control of Cross-media Pollution-An Ecosystem Approach, 27 Nat. Res. J. 21 (1987).
36. J. Carroll speaks of nations as being "toxics conscious." See Carroll, Water Resources
Management as an Issue in Environmental Diplomacy. 26 Nat. Res. J. 207, 210 (1986).
37. European Economic Community Directive No. 76/464/EEC (May 4, 1976) (available at the
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels). For adiscussion, see V. Mandl, The European
Communiry and Water Pollution Control, in River Pollution Control, supra note 25, at 41.
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• approximately 80,000 are in commercial circulation;
" approximately 1,000 new chemicals enter commercial use each
year;
• using the total of world laboratory resources, about 500 chemicals

per year can be tested for toxicity (at colossal expenses); and
" one test, for carcinogenicity alone, can involve 800 test animals
and 40 different tissue specimens per animal for pathology examinations--that is, 32,000 specimens. This requires approximately $500,000 and 3.5 years to perform."
Not unlike many other important environmental issues, the problem
of characterizing and understanding toxic water pollutants is not just a
matter of more analyses. There will remain many aspects of the problem
for which science will not be able to provide answers, at least not in the
medium-term. Moreover, choosing from the thousands of chemical pollutants those that are most toxic or hazardous to humans or ecosystems
is only part of the issue. There remain equally perplexing questions
concerning the migration of these substances into water resources and
their dispersion. According to an experienced water modeler, the concept
of water quality is intrinsically dynamic and uncertain and the standard
dispersion assumptions are often oversimplified.- 9
The Environmental Group Perspective
Since water serves basic human needs, any serious reduction in its
supply or quality is, in the words of Frey and Naff "a fighting matter,
as many a range war in the United States has demonstrated. "' Under
conditions of severe shortage, water or "good quality water" becomes
for many key actors a highly sensitized and zero-sum public issue--one
with alarming potential for conflict.
The issue of Danube water quality is by no means a fighting matter!
On the contrary, it has the status of a routine, regulatory problem in that
it is moderately low-key and spread among many organizations." There
are some indications, however, that it might evolve into a more contentious public issue involving citizen action and environmental groups. Just
38. B. Wynne, Risk Management and Hazardous Wastes 237 (1987).
39. See Beck, supra note 33. at 216. Water pollution is not the only issue in river management
characterized by large uncertainties. Scientific opinion differs widely on such topics as the effects
of artificial reservoirs on a region's groundwater, the extent to which flood protection, irrigation,
and drainage change the fertility of the soil, the transport of pollutants in a river, including changes
in the transport of sediment and the accumulation of silt from water works, the efficiency of filtering
techniques for drinking water, the possibility and implications of long-term fluctuations in water
supply, and generally the prediction of environmental consequences of water development.
40. See Frey & Naff. Water: An Emerging Issue in the Middle East?, Annals of the American
Academy 65, 69 (1984).
41. See Lowi, American Business, Public Policy. Case Studies and Political Theory, 16 World
Politics 677, 693 (1964).
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as the "toxic problem" has become a dominant issue in North America
and in some European countries, there is also growing concern over toxic
pollutants by environmental groups and the public of the Danube countries. The recent accidents resulting in toxic poisoning of the Rhine river
have dramatically intensified this concern by focusing attention on problems of acute toxic water pollution.
The most significant recent development is the emergence of an influential environmental movement in Hungary. This movement has concentrated much initial effort on stalling the planned hydropower stations on
the Danube. The recent loosening of political barriers to environmental
protest has catapulted this issue onto Hungary's turbulent political agenda.
UPSTREAM-DOWNSTREAM DISPUTES

Caldwell has noted the paradoxical circumstance that today only sovereign states can collectively establish the cooperation necessary to resolve
many transnational environmental problems, and yet for that cooperation
to succeed, some part of national sovereignty or of political freedom must
be surrendered. 2 Surrendering this sovereignty in order to address Danube
water quality issues will ultimately require the conditions and incentives
for this cooperation. These conditions are frustrated by the "upstreamdownstream" geopolitics of international rivers, where the upper riparian
countries have distinct advantages in such policy areas as flood control,
apportionment of water supplies, and especially river water contamination. The bargaining chips of the downstream countries may be limited
to such areas as granting navigation rights or contributing to joint hydropower projects.
If negotiation is characterized as an interactive process by which two
or more parties or countries seek cooperatively to do better than they
would have otherwise, then their alternatives to negotiation determine in
some sense their negotiating power.4" Negotiations can be most productive
when this power is evenly distributed or when all parties are capable of
contributing to a common good (or reducing a common bad) without
which each would equally suffer (or benefit). When these conditions are
lacking, such as in the "upstream-downstream" situation, then one can
speak of power asymmetry." One (or more) parties likes things the way
they are and the other (or others) wants to change them. Those who want
changes do not have the means to provide incentives to those interested
in maintaining the status quo. Negotiations can be stymied when there
42. Caldwell, Beyond Environmental Diplomacy: The Changing Institutional Structure of Inter-

national Cooperation, in International Environmental Diplomacy 13 (J.
Carroll ed. 1988).
43. See Lax & Sebenius, The Power ofAlternatives or the Limits to Negotiation, 2 Negotiation

1.215, 218 (3985).
44. See Zartmann, Negotiating from Asymmetry: The North-South Stalemate, Negotiation J 23,
27 (1986).
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appear to be no possibilities for trade, or when one or more of the parties
is reluctant or unwilling to negotiate.'
This asymmetry appears particularly troubling for the Danube river.
As upper riparian countries, West Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia
have less direct interest in improving water quality (the proportion of
water in these countries used for drinking, irrigation, fisheries and tourism
is less than for the countries further downstream), and have further advantages as well. With the exception of Northern Hungary and the Iron
Gate region, the energy potential of the Danube is found mainly in the
upstream countries, which are also more industrialized than many of their
downstream neighbors and thus potentially have more chronic and accidental discharges into the water. As for navigation, the interests of those
countries within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)
in an unrestricted navigation route to the Atlantic are at least as great as
Western Europe's interests in an unrestricted Eastern route. In sum, there
appear to be weaker incentives for the upper Danube riparian countries
to cooperate with those further downstream. Alternatively, the downstream countries, with their large fisheries, tourist industry, and greater
dependence on the Danube for potable water and irrigation, have a great
deal to gain by cooperative policies, especially regarding water quality.
In the opinion of the secretary of the Vienna-based International Society
for Danube Research, the problems presented by the upstream-downstream politics are more formidable for multilateral cooperation than the
problems presented by the East-West politics.'
The issue of "upstream-downstream" is not, however, so clear as it
may at first appear. Each of the Danube riparian countries lies both
upstream and downstream on either the Danube or other rivers crossing
its borders; each country has an internal interest in improving the water
quality within its borders, especially as environmental interests become
more pressing in the upper riparian countries;4 7 and many old and new
factors of joint interests (such as provision of a shipping fleet and groundwater quality) are apparent. In the words of a former member of the Indus
Commission:
[A11 riparian conflicts must be conditioned by the recognition that
fresh-water diplomacy is a symbol and the test for the fundamental
features of international relations: how to balance national interest
(the domestic demands which go with availability of water and the
45. Le Marquand, Politics of International River Basin Cooperation and Management, in Water
in a Developing World, supra note 10, at 72.
46. Personal Interview with E. Weber, International Society for Danube Research, Vienna, Austria
(Apr. 1986).
47. The most upstream riparian, West Germany, has one of the best reputations in the overall
management of its riven.
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emotion which goes with notions of territorial. sovereignty) and the

uncontrollable imperatives of international interdependence. We now
have new factors which underline that "beggar thy neighbor" ap-

proach, and ignoring the logic of integral unity of river basin and
common stakes in the optimal progress of upper and lower riparian
partners, is self-destructive. Ecology and groundwater potential which
do not respect political frontiers and do not necessarily give advantage
to the upper riparians are compulsive new considerations.'
Even recognizing these emerging, compulsive new factors, inter-basin
cooperation will continue to encompass issues, such as water pollution,
characterized by unequal negotiating power. Their solution will presuppose the existence of "political will" on the part of the basin states. Since
the real financial costs of measures such as pollution control may be
substantial, and since national sovereignty is inevitably compromised
through international cooperation, some compensating advantage or incentive to the upper riparian states is a prerequisite for cooperation. This
compensating advantage may be generated internally by the heightened
awareness of environmental issues, or, alternatively, it may be a part of
the bargaining process. In an extreme case, the more developed upper
riparian nations may wish to create "good will" with their neighbors by
contributing more to pollution control while benefitting less.4"
The need for incentives is reinforced by the rudimentary and relatively
ineffectual state of international law as a means of regulating water issues.
Traditionally, four theories governing the use of international -rivers have
been advocated: (1) the Harmon Doctrine which advocates absolute sovereignty to upper riparians; (2) absolute territorial integrity which guarantees the lower riparians the use of the river in an unaltered state; (3)
drainage basin development which stresses mutual development of a river's waters by all riparian states; and, (4) the equitable utilization theory.
or limited territorial sovereignty, which permits use of a river's waters
to the extent of doing no harm to other riparian countries." ° This latter
principle of "reasonable and equitable" utilization of water resources" t
48. Mehta, The Indus Water Treaty. inThe Management of International River Basin Conflicts.
supra note 34. at 33.
49. This asymmetry is also a problem regarding river development projects. Nalven shows how

problems arise with respect to development projects where material contributions represent a greater
fiscal strain for the less developed countries, and he suggests a broader *'internationalcost" concept
for allocating the burdens of the project. This concept, of course, must be sensitive to the social
and cultural differences of the countries involved. See Nalven. Transboundarv Environmental Prob-

lem Solving: Social Process. Cultural Perception. I Transboundary Res. Rep. 4. 4 (1987).
50. See Le Marquand, Politics of International River Basin Cooperation and Management, in
Water in a Developing World. supra note 10. at 48.
51. The equitable utilization theory has become the most widely advocated theory, not only by
the international legal community, but also as evidenced by treaties, judicial decisions, academics,
and international bodies. See Utton. International Water Quality Law. in International Environmental
Law 154 (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1975).
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has now been established by such distinguished bodies as the International
Law Association and International Law Commission of the United Nations." 2 These principles and guidelines, although established as rules of
customary international law, are difficult to apply unless there is an established international river commission to administer the river on an ongoing basis."
Linkages
With the weakness of effective international rules and institutions, and
when one or more of the negotiating partners lacks incentives to agree,
broadening the negotiating agenda or linking even disparate issues may
increase the bargaining potential of all countries. Even between countries,
where there are few explicit tradeoffs, one country may wish to build up
a "reservoir of good will" to draw upon in future dealings. The potential
of problem linkages in resolving long-standing stalemates was seen in a
case involving the Colorado river, where the United States as the upstream
country finally agreed to build a costly desalination plant only after river
pollution was linked to other problems between Mexico and the United
States.' The long deadlocked negotiations were only fruitfully resumed
when the salinity issue became critically important to relations between
Mexico and the United States.
The geopolitics of the Canadian-U.S. boundary, as another example,
are more symmetrical. Both countries lie upstream and downstream on
sometimes even the same rivers, and both are "sinners" regarding pollution practices. Imbalances, of course, exist, but the economies and
societies of these two countries. are so*intertwined that the benefits of
collaborative work are quite apparent. Apportionment and supply issues
dominated U.S.-Canadian negotiations until the early 1970s, when more
qualitative pollution and ecological issues became a primary concern."
Whereas the theory of environmental (and other) linkages is attractive
for refraining issues and facilitating bargaining, too little attention has
been given to the institutional and procedural obstacles for putting theory
into practice. Environmental policy making has become increasingly specialized and fragmented, reducing the possibilities for more holistic ap52. See Solanes. The United Nations Role in Promoting and Fostering Cooperation in the Field
of InternationalWater Resources, in The Management of International River Basin Conflicts. supra

note 34, at 87.
53. See generally. Utton, supra note 51; Teclaff, The Impact of Environmental Concern on the
Development of InternationalLa, 13 Nat. Res. J.355, 357 (1973).
54. See Gantz. United States Approaches to the Salinity Problem on the Colorado River. 12 Nat.
Res. J.496 (1972): Utton. Problems and Successes of International WaterAgreements: The Example
of the United States and Mexico, in International Environmental Diplomacy 117, 122 (J.Carroll ed.
1988).
55. For a full discussion, see Carroll, supra note 36.
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proaches.se Expanding the water quality negotiation agenda to include,
say, controls for dealing with acid rain or even groundwater introduces
a staggering degree of complexity into the process. From a procedural
perspective, this may be possible only by moving the issue to a higher
political level, as was the case in the Mexico-U.S. negotiations.
A special kind of linkage involves monetary compensation or "side
payments." While paying the polluting country to clean up violates the
polluter-pays-principle, it may be the only route to promote the desired
changes, as evidenced by the recent proposal that the Netherlands and
West Germany compensate France for the costly process changes necessary to reduce the salinity of the Rhine.'Another type of linkage, which
is relevant mainly for the developing world, is international loans and
subsidies for river development. Mehta describes how the World Bank
with its lure of development funds became an independent arbitrator in
the negotiations leading to the Indus Water Treaty in 1960. " Le Marquand
describes a similar process of agreement on the Senegal river, where the
prospective funds from the international community for its large-scale
development served to mute much interstate conflict.'
COOPERATION THROUGH BILATERAL, STEPWISE
NEGOTIATIONS

Improving the water quality of the Danube through cooperative decisionmaking will be seriously complicated by the power asymmetry between the upstream and downstream riparians and the scientifically complex
and ill-defined nature of the water pollution issue. Cooperative policy
making will also be hampered by the lack of an existing river basin
regime for multilateral, integrated decisionmaking on the Danube.
Despite these obstacles, ministers from the eight riparian countries who
signed the non-binding Danube Declaration stated that:
The governments of the Danube states will endeavor to solve, stepwise, through bilateral and multilateral agreements, the concrete
56. Le Marquand has shown that this fragmentation is also apparent within the foreign policy
institutions which may be responsible for conducting the negotiations, but which are dependent on
other government institutions (such as justice, finance, water resources, and environment) for technical expertise and resources. Without interfe ne and direction from above, the foreign affairs

department may be severely restricted in the policy options it can pursue. Le Marquand, Politics of
International River Basin Cooperation and Management, in Water in a Developing World, supra
note 10, at 159.

57. Personal Communication with E. Ferguson, Secretaty of the Dutch Committee on the laternational Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), in Amsterdam (Nov. 1986).
58. See Mehta, The Indus Water Trat y, in the Management of International River Basin Conflicts,
supra note 34 at 47.
59. Le Manpuand, International Development of the Senegal River. in The Management of Intemational River Basin Conflicts, supra note 34, at 68.
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problems of the Danube, especially with respect to its water quality,

which is of life-giving importance to the Danube countries.'
Of special interest is how the signing ministers of these eight countries
intend to secure the cooperation necessary for dealing with the manifold
issues of Danube water quality. In this regard, the above quote from the
Danube Declaration is revealing, especially its wording "to solve stepwise
through bilateral and multilateral agreements." Any progress on combatting the pollution of the Danube will be made through narrowly focused, rather than integrated and more comprehensive agreements, between
two or maybe clusters of countries. As expressed by a member of the
Austrian-Czechoslovakian Border Commission, the non-binding Danube
Declaration should be viewed primarily as a signal for the riparian countries to establish more encompassing bilateral agreements, particularly in
addressing problems of water quality.'
"Functional" and "participant" incrementalism appears, therefore, to
be the explicit strategy envisaged by the signing ministers of the Danube
Declaration. In this context, incrementalism means making progress by
stages, or often ad hoc sequencing, related to Lindblom's seminal description of "disjointed incrementalism."' As increasingly complex problems emerge on the international negotiating agenda, the political actors
often muddle through with strategic blinders -structuring the issues and
bounding each subissue in such a way that it is reduced in its complexity.' 3
Functional incrementalism, then, means that progress is made by partial
rather than holistic improvements. A counterpart to this functional incrementalism is the concept of participant incrementalism, where agreements
are first negotiated only among the most receptive participants with the
intention of adding to this core consensus through subsequent negotiations.
Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements: Participant Incrementalism
The Danube Declaration has set the stage for individual country initiatives in negotiating agreements with neighboring countries, in other
words, for cooperation through bilateral or multilateral arrangements.
This stands in contrast to the 20th century theme of basin-wide planning,
where various forms of river basin commissions deal cooperatively on
managing water resources common to more than one jurisdiction.' There
are many different types of river basin organizations with widely differing
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Danube Declaration. supra note I, at 429.
Personal Interview with E. Schmidt, Austrian-Czechoslovakian Border Commission (1986).
Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through. 19 Pub. Admin. R. 79, 83 (1959).
See Linneroth, The PoliticalProcessing ofUncerrainy 56 Acta Psychologia 219, 224 (1984).
See Teclaff, supra note 10, at 75.
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functions, ranging from the integrated management of a drainage basin
or watercourse system, to the management of a development project
through a single-purpose commission,' to the management of data and

statistics.' These institutions also differ regarding their respective powers
and procedures. Of special interest here are those commissions with
explicit mandates to anticipate disputes between the riparians and to
facilitate their resolution." Helping resolve disputes is critically impor-

tant, especially since there are few examples of multi-purpose commissions with significant decisionmaking power." According to Caponera:
National interests often prevail when shared resources have to be
allocated, when priorities have to be established among different
uses, and when decisions have to be enforced. Decision making on
these issues seldom rests in a joint commission, committee, or like
institution. More often, all relevant decisions are negotiated piecemeal and approved unanimously by all states concerned, whether
separately or within a collegiate body. Institutionalized cooperation
is more successful in preparing the necessary data for decision making.'

Even though experience is limited at the international level, there has
been important experience with multi-purpose, integrated commissions

for dealing with regional water problems on the national (federal) level,
for example, the interstate river administrations existing in Argentina,
Australia, Canada, the United States, and India. The river basin concept
has also spurred the emergence of a new type of regional institute, the
65: For example, the Niger River Authority has the purpose of insuring an integrated development
program for all Niger basin water resources and activities. See Caponera, Patterns of Cooperation
in International Water Law: Principles and Institutions, 25 Nat. Res. J. 563, 563-87 (1985).
66. For example, the Danube Commission has responsibility only for navigation. See S. Gorove,
supra note 6, at 28.
67. New institutional mechanisms in the form of joint permanent technical committees have
recently been created in Southern Africa, see Caponera, supra note 65. For the Danube, this function
is filled, but only to some extent, by the International Association for Danube Research, itself a part
of the International Society for Limnology. This inter-basin association carries out research on topics
related to the chemical, biological, and general life properties of the Danube, but does not do any
policy related research. It would be of only limited value, thus, in advising on the priorities to be
established for different uses and users of the river.
68. For example, the Niger River Commission was created among the nine riparian countries for
planning, exchanging information, preparing recorded decisions to be taken by member governments,
and settling disputes between the parties. Also, the International Joint Commission (IJC) between
Canada and the U.S. was originally created for preventing and settling water disputes. See Le
Maquand, Politics of International River Basin Coooperation and Management, in Water in a
Developing World, supra note 10, at 76.
69. An exception may be the Senegal River Basin Management Organization (OMVS) with four
riparian members which encourages and coordinates water resources development in the Senegal.
The unanimous decisions of the Conference of the Council of Ministries of the OMVS automatically
bind its member states. See id.
70. Caponera, supra note 65, at 569.
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valley authority, a trend which also became apparent at the international

level in the 1960s.'
Besides facilitating the resolution of riparian disputes, another important function of a multinational, integrated organization is its potential
for building transnational and transgovernmental coalitions to deal with
multiple and imperfectly linked issues.' However, as Majone has argued
with respect to global regulatory agencies, there may be serious conceptual and pragmatic problems with organizations responsible for coordinating policies with widely differing local causes and consequences, that
is, the high transaction costs involved and the reluctance of nations to
sacrifice their sovereignty." Aside from the many advantages and disadvantages, it is unlikely that minigovernments with the power to legislate
and implement river basin policies across national boundaries will emerge.
The role of transboundary commissions in defining negotiating agendas,
linking issues, and facilitating the negotiating process may, on the other
hand, have considerable potential promise.
The political obstacles for creating a supra-national river commission
for the Danube, or even a multi-purpose commission with limited powers,
are apparent from the history of the Danube Commission. This singlepurpose Commission has been the most influential international organization dealing with the Danube, though only with matters regarding navigation.7' Created in its present form after the Second World War, it is a
decidedly riparian institution, where the East European countries have a
clear majority. West Germany continues to have observer status only.
Despite the power imbalance, in many respects the Commission may be
considered a prototype for East-West cooperation, but only in a narrowlydefined functional field." This same cooperation is not likely to develop
in areas outside of navigation.
71. In an analysis of federal experience with interstate authorities, Alheritiere shows that the idea
of establishing a supranational, integrated, multi-purpose drainage basin commission is largely
utopian, and may be unnecessary. Some of the more iffective interstate policies have been set by
commissions not dealing with the entire river basin or not having jurisdiction over all the uses of
the river. See Alheritiere, Settlement of Public International Disputes on Shared Resources. Elements
of a ComparativeStudy of InternationalInstruments. 25 Nat. Res. J. 701 (1985).
72. See R. Koehane & J. Nye. Power and Interdependence (1977).
73. Majone. International Institutions and the Environment, in Sustainable Development of the
Biosphere 137, 143 (W. Clark & R. Munn eds. 1986).
74. Currently, the Danube river is regulated by the Belgrade Convention of 1948 and by a series
of special agreements. The Danube Commission deals with problems concerning the regulation of
the Danube for navigation purposes, the maintenance of the navigable channels, regulations regarding
signals, safety matters, etc., measures against the obstruction of channels with ice, taxes on ship
traffic, development of the Danube fleet, improvement of navigation technology, development of
industries and harbors, and general water management. It plays only a small role in energy projects
and flood control. See S. Gorove, supra note 6, at 154.
75. The processes of the DC have been described as cumbersome and sometimes frustratingly
slow-and its secretariat remains largely powerless, yet it has functioned quite effectively as an
instrument of East-West cooperation. The principle of unanimity has protected those in the minority
from being forced into decisions to which they object and the search or a consensus has often resulted
in constructive compromises. For a full history of the Danube Commission, see F. Pichler, Die
Donau Kommission und die Donaustaaten: Kooperation und Integration (1973).
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As Pichler writes, it would have been natural for the highly qualified
and ever increasing membership of the Danube Commission to have
expanded its authority from that of navigation to areas such as energy
production and water planning.76 This integrative process did not occur,
however, and for deliberate political reasons. The neutral and non-aligned
countries, Austria and Yugoslavia, formed a blocking coalition preventing
the USSR from expanding the influence of the Danube Commission, and
thus its own influence, beyond that of navigation. According to Schmitter,
this was a predictable process of regional integration, where decisions of
the commission were "encapsulated" rather than allowed to spill over
into other areas.'
It is clear from the history of the Danube Commission that cooperation
among the eight riparian countries on issues such as transfrontier water
pollution will not be facilitated through the creation of a multi-purpose
commission with the breadth to make politicized tradeoffs between the
conflicting interests or uses of the river, or even with the power to facilitate
negotiations. A single-purpose commission for water quality monitoring
and pollution control, as advocated by Benedek and Laszlo,"' also does
not appear likely at the current time. In the absence of an international
river basin authority, the most likely mechanism for achieving collaboration appears to be through mainly bilateral agreements. Table 2 shows
that, with only two exceptions, all agreements and treaties for the Danube
tributaries and especially the border waters have been bilateral.
What this style of river management means, in contrast to an idealized
multi-purpose, supranational, basin-wide commission, is that joint decisions will be made through agreements involving complex procedures
of international bargaining. In Austria, for example, authority for the
Danube, both domestically and internationally, is spread among six federal government ministries and their various service organizations., 9 The
jurisdiction of these federal ministries ends with the Danube and border
waters; responsibility for all other Austrian rivers rests with the Austrian
provinces.'o Environmental groups are also arriving on the scene with
76. Id. at 71.
77. See Schmitter, A Revised Theory of Regional Integration. 4 Int. Organization 82, 86 (1970).
78. See Benedek & Laszlo. supra note 5 at 64.
79. The Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry has responsibility for tie water quality of the
Danube and frontier waters, whereas the Ministry of Health and Environment must assure safe
drinking water. Hydro-electric and other projects must be approved by the Ministry for Construction
and Technology, which has a special fund (Water Management Fund) for subsidizing sewage systems
and water treatment plants. The Water Police (Strom Polizei), which are responsible for enforcing
the navigation codes, are located within the Ministry for the Interior, whereas the Shipping Police
(Schiffahrts Polizei), which assure that the channel is properly marked, etc., is part of the Ministry
of Transportation. Coordinating water policies with other countries brings in another governmental
authority, the Foreign Affairs Ministry.
80. Constitutionally, the Austrian Federal Government has responsibility for all' rivers in the
country. Bundesverfassungsgesetz. Art. 102, Para. 2 (Austrian Constitution). In practice, however,
the powers of the responsible federal ministries are restricted to maintaining and regulating the
Danube. March. and Theya (Bundesgesetzblatt Nr. 78. Para. 120. 1987). This dispersed authority
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Table 2. Some Multilateral and Bilateral Agreements Concerning the Danube
Year

Coumries

Topic of Agreement

1948
(1960-

(Austria), Bulgaria CSSR,
Hungary, Rumania, Ukraine,
USSR. Austria)

Danube Convention of navigation of
Danube

1950

Hungary. USSR

Convention to prevent floods and
regulate R. Tisza

1952

Rumania. USSR

Convention to prevent floods and
regulate R. Prut

1954

Austria. Yugoslavia

Convention concerning water economy
questions relating to R. Drava

1954

Austria, Yugoslavia

Convention concerning water economy
questions relating to R. Mura

1955

Rumania, Yugoslavia

Agreement concerning control of
frontier waters

1955

Hungary, Yugoslavia

Agreement concerning water economy

1956

Austria. Hungary

Treaty concerning water economy in
frontier regions

1956

Albania. Yugoslavia

Agreement concerning water economy
in frontier regions

1957

Hungary. Yugoslavia

Agreement concerning fishing in
frontier waters

1957

Rumania. Yugoslavia

Agreement extending R. Prut
convention (1952) to Tisza, Suceava
and Siret, and other frontier waters

1958

CSSR, Poland

Agreement concerning use of frontier

1958

Bulgaria, Yugoslavia

Agreement concerning water economy

1959

Rumania, USSR

Agreement extending R. Prut
convention (1952) to Danube

1963

Rumania. Yugoslavia

Agreement relating to navigation and
power generation Iron Gates

1967

Austria, CSSR

Treaty relating to management of
frontier waters

1969

Hungary, Rumania

Convention relating to control of
frontier waters

1971

West Germany. CSSR

Local (nongovemment) commission
dealing with pollution and
management of frontier waters

water resources

Source: World Health Organization, Study and Assessment of the Water Quality of the River Danube,
ICP/RCP 204 0301 1, Geneva (1982).
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strong protests over the possible ecological and water quality consequences of the planned hydropower stations in Austria and further downstream.
While the federal government in Austria has full control over the Danube, this is not the case for two neighboring countries, West Germany
and Czechoslovakia, where the respective state (UInder) governments
have the primary responsibility for all rivers within their territories."
Hungary might be considered at the other extreme of Austria, since most
of the competence for the Danube river is found in one central body, the
National Water Authority. 82
Stepwise Agreements: Functional Incrementalism
The difficulties in coordinating measures and testing protocols for conventional water pollution and the huge number of proven and potentially
toxic substances which find their way into water supplies underscore the
need for regulatory attention to be selective. A comprehensive policy for
water pollution with the many diverse sources and effects of hazardous
pollutants would overwhelm any regulatory authority as well as efforts
to negotiate a common policy between two or more countries. Setting
boundaries on the negotiating agenda and proceeding stepwise through
the intricacies of the problem will be essential.8 3
As emphasized by the Danube Declaration, the first step in grappling
with the manifold problems of improving Danube water quality is arriving
at a common agreement on what water quality is and how it should be
tested. This means harmonizing the many divergent testing protocols
found on the Danube, a process which will meet all the definitional and.
administrative complications discussed in Section II[."
can lead to serious problems in coordination, for instance, if the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry
detects a change in the water quality of the Danube, it may find it difficult to track the source of
the pollution to the tributaries which are outside its jurisdiction.
81. World Health Organization. Water Quality Protection of the River Danube. ICP Proposal
2009 (1986).
82. World Health Organization, Pilot Zones for Water Quality Management in Hungary. HUN/
711505-Hun PIP001 (1976).
83. For a discussion of the political bounding of a similar issue, see M. Dowling & J. Linnerooth.
The Listing and Classifying of Hazardous Wastes, IASA Doc.# WP-84-26 (1984) (available at
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg. Austria).
84. Obstacles to better coordination of technical definitions and practices have been clearly
illustrated by attempts on the part of the European Economic Community to harmonize standards
for water quality, which have met with resistance from countries with different administrative working
definitions. For example, the U.K. has developed a philosophy of performance-based standards
which is contrary to the EC's concept of uniform limit values. See Biggs. Quality Objectives and
Fixed Emission Standards-anIndustrial View, in River Pollution Control, supra note 25, at 31-35.
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The Austrian-Czechoslovakian Agreement on Testing the Water
Quality of the Frontier Waters
The workings of the Austrian-Czechoslovakian Border Commission,"'
and a recent agreement within this Commission on common definitions
and testing protocols for measuring the water quality of the frontier waters, '
present a good example of the incremental (participant and functional)
procedures set out in the Danube Declaration. This agreement, marking
the first stage in the eventual improvement of Danube water quality,
involved only two countries, and discussions were confined to a narrow
concept of water quality. Besides oxygen content and biological indices,
the measures included water pH, ammonia, nitrates and nitrites, phosphorus, chloride, calcium, magnesium, mineral oil, and the hardness of
the water. The agreed-upon protocol did not include tests for heavy metals,
pesticides, carcinogens, and other toxic substances found, for example,
on the EC Black List. Despite its limited scope, it is valuable as a first
step in reaching an overall basin-wide agreement on data collection for
water quality measurements, and it may serve as a model for further
riparian agreements. 7 The way in which this agreement was reached,
then, is of interest.
The loosely-knit Border Commission is composed of four commissioners from each country, representing separate federal ministries concerned with different aspects of water management. When problems
concerning the border waters (for example regulation, flood control, and
water supply) come to their attention, usually a working group of experts
from both countries is established which makes recommendations to the
Commission. These recommendations are approved only with unanimous
agreement among the eight commissioners. Once agreements are reached
by the Commission, they must then be ratified by the respective federal
parliaments. Over a period of six years, the Austrian and Czechoslovakian
expert committee for establishing testing protocols met regularly and,
with the eventual imposition of a deadline by the Commission, reached
an agreement. Having agreed within the expert committee, approval by
both the Border Commission and the respective national parliaments was
proforma.8 This represents an example, then, of negotiation and decision
by expert committee.
The question arises as to why the current interest on the part of Austria
and Czechoslovakia exists in coordinating policies leading eventually to
85. See the Treaty Concerning the Regulation of Water Management Questions Relating to Frontier
Waters, art. 314, Dec. 7, 1967, Austria-Czechoslovakia, 728 U.N.T.S. 313.
86. Gemeinsame Methodik der Untersuchungen des Gfitezustandes der 6sterreichisch-Tschechoslowakischen Grenzwasser (1986).
87. See Schmidt, supra note 61.

88. The Austrian parliament has ratified the agreement (Oct. 1986), and Czechoslovakian ratification is expected shortly.
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an improvement in the quality of the frontier rivers, especially in view
of Austria's position as the upstream country. The answer appears to lie
in the long-standing concern on the part of both countries in improving
the water quality of the heavily polluted March, a river forming the border
between Austria and Czechoslovakia and an important tributary to the
Danube. This interest became acute for both countries when plans were
made to construct the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros barrage and hydroelectric
system. This project, which is now being reconsidered, required an improvement in the organic water quality of the Danube. For Austria, which
planned to participate in the financing of this project and, in return, receive
electric power, the water quality issue was linked with its interests in
hydropower generation in the downstream countries.
OUTLOOK: A ROLE FOR THE ANALYST?

The signing ministers of the Danube Declaration have emphasized that
a balanced management of the Danube river can be achieved only through
cooperation among the eight riparian countries. Establishing this cooperation, especially on improving the water quality of the Danube, will
be complicated by the power asymmetry between the upstream and downstream countries, the scientifically complex and ill-defined nature of the
problem, and the lack of an effective river basin authority for multilateral,
integrated decisionmaking on the Danube.
A more comprehensive and expedient program for tackling the problems of Danube water pollution is also limited by the inherent difficulties
sovereign states face in negotiating environmental issues. In a recent
article, von Moltke questions whether sovereign states can speak for all
interests within their jurisdiction, and particularly for the needs of 'environmental protection." However, there is a trend toward enlarging the
circle of participants recognized as having legitimate interests and a right
for participation in the international negotiations. International cooperation is more and more influenced by non-governmental organizations
operating across political and bureaucratic boundaries and forming networks of influence on policy decisions.' This influence has worked toward the institutionalization of international cooperation. The viability of
many international institutions would be doubtful were it not for the
presence of non-governmental organizations behind them. Yet progress
will not be rapid. International negotiating processes have adjusted slowly
to the existence of non-governmental participants.
89. See K. von Moltke, Scientists, Environmentaliss, Local and Regional Officials: Nontraditional

Participants in International Enviromtal Negotiations (Working Paper prepared for the U.S.
Environment and Natural Resources Task Group, Processes of International Negotiation Program,
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge. Mass. 1987).
90. See Caldwell, supra note 42, at 13.
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The problem of toxic water pollution on the Danube has emerged as
an issue only within certain non-governmental groups, and almost exclusively in the more developed upper and middle riparian states. To date,
only a limited program for the development of common testing protocols
has found its way onto the negotiating agenda, and these protocols will
encompass mainly tests for the more traditional indicators of water quality.
As a low-key issue, progress on Danube water pollution will undoubtedly
continue very slowly within the incremental procedures laid out in the
Danube Declaration. Only as the issue becomes more urgent from the
perspective of the scientific community and from the standpoint of the
public can more expedient actions be anticipated, but only to the extent
that these groups gain standing on the negotiating agenda. The public
visibility of the Danube water pollution issue in the different riparian
countries is therefore critical to the progress of negotiated solutions. This
visibility will depend to a large extent on the economic development of
the countries and the corresponding consciousness and concern about
environmental problems on the part of the public and the scientific community. At the present, this consciousness varies widely among the eight
riparians.
The perceived seriousness of the issue will also depend on future events
and their media coverage. Nelkin shows the importance of the media in
defining and articulating environmental issues and in establishing a framework of expectations that can influence the agenda of international negotiations. 9 ' In the case of complex environmental problems, such as
toxic water pollution, the public relies heavily on the media as the major
source of information defining the reality of the situation for them, although different populations and different subcultures within populations
will process this information differently. The media stimulates demands"
for accountability, forcing negotiators to justify themselves to their constituencies. The extensive media coverage of the Rhine river .accidents
may be a crucial initiating event, at least in the more developed, upper
riparian countries.
A Role for the Analyst?
Even if Danube water quality emerges as an urgent public issue with
corresponding pressures on international negotiators, difficult scientific
issues, and equally perplexing institutional problems, will stand in the
path of its resolution. With the complexity of both the scientific issues
and the procedural mechanisms, analysts have become concerned about
91. See D. Nelkin, The Role of the Media in International Environmental Negotiations Program

(Process of International Negotiation Working Paper, American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Cambridge. Mass. 1987).
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how they can be more effective, not only in identifying transfrontier
environmental problems and alternatives for their solution, but also in
providing support for negotiating international treaties and agreements
for their resolution. The use of computerized support systems for aiding
policy makers and negotiators has become especially typical.
A wide range of scientific opinion accompanies most environmental
issues. In the case of the Danube, for example, there are serious conflicts
concerning the effects of river development projects on the quality of the
Danube water, the groundwater, and the general ecology of the river
basin. Many view the negotiation process, thus, as foremost an exercise
in joint learning to reach common understandings and eventual solutions.
A hypothesis underlying much of the literature on the use of computers
to facilitate or aid negotiations is that information forms a neutral ground
for agreement which can free the path for trading off legitimate differences
in interests.' Raiffa, in noting the enormous scientific complexity in
international environmental disputes, notes also the important question
of the interrelation between facts and interests:
Negotiators must argue the merits of their cases, but they don't know
the physical facts. There is a need for some mutual learning. How
do they learn together and still protect their own interests? That is
the beauty of the problem.93
This problem of learning together is fundamental to the use of computer
support systems in aiding negotiations. This section will briefly discuss
the potential and limitations of computer aided negotiations (CAN) for
two distinctly different negotiation settings: (1) the "win-win" bargaining
setting where all the parties perceive mutual gains in cooperative behavior,
and (2) the more adversarial setting where the parties perceive more "winlose" outcomes. The former can be likened to the routine negotiation of
water quality testing between Austria and Czechoslovakia, whereas the
latter is more representative of the water quality issue involving disputes
over river development and the ecological preservation of the river.
Mutual Learning and "Win-Win" Bargaining
Less adversarial "win-win" negotiations are more receptive to joint
learning and cooperative problem solving than disputes for which the
advantages of arriving at mutual compromises are not so apparent. The
most outstanding example of the use of the computer in a negotiation in
which all parties perceived possible benefits was the U.N. Law of the
92. See H. Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (1982); Colosi. A Model for Negotiation
and Mediation. Int. Negotiation 81 (D. Bendahmane & J. McDonald eds. 1984).
93. Raiffa, Mock Pseudo-Negotiations with Surrogate Disputants. 2 Negotiation J. 15 (1985).
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Sea Conference." Because of its likeness to many international negotiations for river development, it deserves mention here.
The resolution of the problem of the deep sea mining of manganese
modules" became important for an international agreement on the common use of the oceans. Prior to the negotiations, the U.N. General Assembly declared the deep sea resources to be the "common heritage of
mankind," ' and the task of the negotiations was to find a system for
their equitable sharing. A conflict developed between the developing and
developed countries concerning the profitability of deep sea-bed mining
and how the proceeds from mining enterprises could be fairly distributed.
After six years of intensive negotiations, a compromise agreement was
reached by the over 140 negotiating countries, which appears to have
been partly attributable to the joint exploration and learning made possible
by a computer model developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology showing the engineering and financial aspects of module recovery
and processing.97
Sebenius attributes the acceptance of the model largely to the properties
of the model itself, that established it as unbiased, objective, and credible.9" Since similar examples of mutual learning and model acceptance
are so few, and since all modeling efforts-the MIT model includedhave an inherent, subjective component, it is important to look beyond
the model to the conditions of the negotiations themselves, which led to
a willingness on the part of the negotiators to find a consensus on the
structure and analysis of the problem. One likely factor was the "winwin" nature of the negotiations, which gave a strong incentive for the
delegates to resolve the distributive questions. Also, the relative newness
of the issue and accompanying lack of entrenched interests within countries made it easier for delegates to embrace an outside problem formulation. Without the overriding need to justify their positions in their own
countries, the delegates had more flexibility to accept "neutral" evidence.
Finally, the delegates represented, for the most part, government ministries, for example finance and foreign affairs, which means that in spite
94. For a full account, see Sebenius, The Computer as Mediator: Law of the Sea and Beyond, I
J. Pol. Analysis & Mgmt. 77 (1981).
95. The modules are composed of commercially promising quantities of copper. cobalt, nickel,
and manganese.
96. U.N. G.A. Res. 2749. 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (N. 280), at 24. U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
97. See J. Nyhart, L. Antrim. A. Capstaff. A. Kohler & D. Leshaw. A Cost Model of Ocean
Mining and Associated Regulatory Issues, MIT Sea Grant Report MrTS6 78-4 (1978).
98. According to Sebenius, several factors influenced the acceptance of tie model: (I) the model
was developed independently of the LOS Conference; (2) the model's early results fully pleased no
delegation, confirming in some sense its neutrality; (3) the presentation of the model's results by
the MIT groups highlighted the uncertainties, increasing further its credibility: and (4) the chairman
of the financial group, who was highly respected by the delegates, strongly favored the use of the
model. Sebenius. supra note 94 at 80,
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of their national differences they shared a certain professional rationality
and thus a common overall frame of the issue."
Although on a more modest level, these same conditions also exist in
many negotiation forums, such as the bilateral expert committee appointed
by the Austrian-Czechoslovakian Border Commission to work out an
agreement on testing protocols for the quality of the border waters. "
The informal, side-by-side work of these expert committees allows flexibility for brainstorming and joint problem solving. Fisher has contrasted
this style of negotiation with more formal, around-the-table diplomatic
sessions, and has stressed the advantages of the reduced authority of
advisory committees giving the members more freedom to explore interests and to invent options that might promote shared concerns and
accommodate those that differ.' 0 ' Independent, outside expertise can then
be brought in to aid the negotiations in much the same way as the MIT
model was used in the LOS Conference.
In other words, limited-authority committees may provide fertile ground
to aid negofor the use of independently developed, interactive models
tiators of water resources. These models will have a narrow perspective
because of the usually narrowly-defined problems with which these committees deal. In reviewing some 30 years of systems models in water
resources management, it has been concluded that the disappointing influence of comprehensive regional or basin-wide studies on negotiated
policies can be attributed, in part, to the failure of these models to meet
the narrower agendas and needs of the decisionmakers and negotiators. "
Loucks and others applaud, thus, the apparent shift to the more projectoriented models addressing narrower issues:
Policy changes will continue to be incremental and, barring serious
surprises, decisions will rarely be revolutionary. Hence, policy modelers and analysts should focus their problem and issue-oriented
research on helping to guide these incremental changes.""
Recognizing both the value of an integrated system in clarifying the
complex tradeoffs at a more aggregated level, for example the relation
between deforestation and river water quality, and the need for decisionmakers and negotiators to have more narrowly focused information, Kovacs has proposed a hierarchal system of decision support systems for
managing large international rivers which can anticipate the expected
consequences of policy options at various levels of decisionmaking.'°
99. Id. at 78.
100. See Treaty, supra note 85.
101. Fisher, The Structure of Negotiation: An Alternative Model, 2 Negotiation J. 138 (1986).
102. Loucks, Kindler & Fedra, Interactive Water Resources Modeling and Model Use: An Overview, 21 Water Res. Research 95 (1985).
103. Id.

104. Kovacs, supra not 34.
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For basin-wide planners, the model would give aggregated results which
could be disaggregated for the types of decisions negotiated by, for example, such bodies as Border Commissions.
Mutual Learning and Adversarial Negotiations
In 1986, Hungarian and Austrian environmentalists attempted to march
around Margaret Island in the middle of the Danube at Budapest. They
were expressing their concern over the damage that they believed would
result from the proposed Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric system.
This type of protest will occur much more frequently throughout the
East-protests over perceived adverse impacts will happen as a result of
proposed water resource development schemes. In fact, as Loucks and
Salewicz point out, there is no shortage of disputes over issues involving
water resources anywhere in the world."~
Protests in Austria and Hungary over river development projects are
only just emerging and signal a beginning interest of environmental groups
in the Danube. A notable and recent development in the East European
countries, especially Hungary, is that these groups are gaining political
standing. With the emergence of such groups, analysts must confront the
problems of dispute settlement. Loucks and Salewicz suggest a role for
information sharing and mutual learning in negotiating a resolution to
adversarial- environmental disputes.lh Information sharing, in the form
of interactive, decision or negotiation support, could facilitate more informed negotiations by, at least, focusing the debate on the assumptions
and data.
Their advocacy of information systems as a way of facilitating multistakeholder disputes fails to account, however, for some fundamental
differences in situations where negotiation participants, on the one hand,
want to solve a common problem cooperatively, whereas on the other
hand, (potentially hostile) parties view the outcomes more as zero-sum
alternatives. Research in multiperson decision support systems (DSS) has
mostly addressed the first situation where knowledge sharing and preference aggregation have been the main issues. The majority of these DSS
systems have been employed in essentially a common problem or problem
frame." Neither of these assumptions is generally appropriate for more
adversarial bargaining among groups with different perceptions of the
problem and different ideas for dealing with it. For these situations, a
fundamental shift will be necessary to orient negotiation support away
105. See Loucks & Salewicz, Interactive Modeling and Conflict Negotiation in Water Resources
Planing, in The Management of International River Basin Conflicts, supra note 34, at i.

106. Id.
107. Jarke, Knowledge Sharing and Negotiation Support-in Multiperson Decision Support Systems. 2 Decision Support Systems 93 (1986).
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from "information, analysis and solution" to providing the very mechanisms necessary for a constructive dialogue."ta
In closing, it should be noted that this brief discussion has looked at
only one aspect of the computer for providing negotiation support to
promote mutual learning through flexible or interactive modeling. Many
other promising opportunities exist, for example, in group modeling and
gaming exercises which permit mutual generation and exploration of
scenarios. Also, more game theoretic and decision analytic programs have
been developed to help the group explore outcomes in terms of the preferences and values of the negotiating partners. The use of the computer
for aiding negotiations is an exciting new direction, but a direction which
can benefit from a better understanding of the human, organizational, and
political setting which ultimately determines the effectiveness of the computer as a negotiating tool.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The signing ministers of the Danube Declaration have emphasized that

a balanced management of the Danube River Basin can be achieved only
through cooperation among the eight riparian countries. Establishing effective cooperation in improving the water quality of the Danube will be
severely hampered by the power asymmetry between the upstream and
downstream countries, the scientifically complex and ill-defined nature
of the problem, the lack of an effective river basin regime for multilateral,
integrated decisionmaking on the Danube, and the slow and uneven
emergence of public concern in the riparian countries.
Sovereign nations with upstream advantages will be reluctant to negotiate water quality improvements unless compensating benefits are an
implicit or explicit part of the bargain. Harmonizing parameters and
definitions of water quality as a first step in its control will be complicated
by the scientific gaps in understanding the effects of water pollutants,
especially toxic substances and their dispersion, as well as the divergent
national perceptions of the issue and resulting differences in definitions.
Finally, the process superimposes another level of complexity. In the
absence of any present or perspective basin wide river authority to deal
with water pollution, progress will be made only through a series of
mostly bilateral agreements covering small, "bounded" segments of the
108. Nalven for example, suggests a social process model for analyzing transboundary environmental cooperation which focuses on the evolution of technical relationships between nations of
markedly different development statuses. Cooperation on the part of the riparians is not simply a
technical affair, but social. Since culturally determined expectations will be different among the
countries, it may be necessary for the participants of the negotiations to "translate the border"-its
imagery, social expectations, jurisdictional responsibilities and processes as well as the differences
in resources. Nalven, supra note 49 at 4.
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problem, as illustrated by the recent bilateral agreement between Austria
and Czechoslovakia on water quality parameters and testing protocols.
To the extent that Danube water pollution becomes a more visible issue
as a result of (1) increasing public awareness and concern over toxic
pollutants, especially accidental releases, or (2) becoming enmeshed in
the current controversies over Danube development projects, the process
will need to accommodate the interests and views of environmental groups,
which are newly and dramatically emerging in Eastern Europe. This will
dislodge the issue from the routine, administrative machinery of regulatory politics and place it in the broader and more contentious context
of environmental and ecological preservation. As the issue changes form,
new procedural mechanisms and different types, of analytical expertise
will be called upon in the process of negotiating cooperative policies.
The dynamics of the issue underscores the need for different types of
analytical support depending on its form. As a low-key, regulatory issue
and with an a priori agreement on definition, negotiation forums could
be usefully served with narrowly defined support systems which facilitate
mutual learning and problem solving. If the issue broadens both in terms
of the problem and the stakeholders, then the concept of "mutual learning" becomes problematic. To be useful, negotiation support systems will
have to accommodate plural problem definitions and rationalities which
may be inconsistent with the logic of the system designer. The focus of
multi-party negotiation support in an adversarial setting will, therefore,
have to reorient from systems emphasizing shared information and analysis to systems which promote communication and mutual problem formulation.
As a final word, the importance of examining international mechanisms
which have evolved for managing and negotiating water issues cannot be
overemphasized. To date, nearly all forms of international cooperation
with respect to shared resources have been in connection with surface
water and aquatic resources, and these institutionalized forms of cooperative decisionmaking could potentially form the basis for coping with
cross-media, as well as transboundary, pollution problems. How problems
and disputes over the shared uses of water resources have been negotiated
and resolved, how past and present institutions have succeeded or failed,
and the ways in which the analyst can contribute to the substantive and
procedural issues, are questions of increasing concern if the world community is to cope with the expanding menu of transboundary and crossmedia environmental problems.

